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I. INTRODUCTION
The garden is a busy place in Fourth Amendment lore, for it is the site
of recurring attempts by police officers to investigate criminal activity
free from the constitutional restraints of the probable cause and warrant
requirements. The target of police intrusions may be the garden itself,
the interior of the home beyond the garden, or the opportunities for
discoveries to be made in both locations. In 1986, the Supreme Court
divided five to four in California v. Ciraolo,1 holding that police officers
did not perform a constitutional “search” or “seizure”2 when they used
an airplane to fly over an enclosed backyard, in order to look into the
garden of a particular householder from 1000 feet in the air. The
officers spied incriminating evidence in that garden, which supplied the
probable cause needed to obtain a warrant that allowed a search of both
the yard and the house.3 The Court concluded that the householder could
have no “reasonable expectation of privacy”4 from aerial police surveillance,
because any member of the public “could have seen everything”5
that the police officers observed, when flying at the same low altitude
over the house and yard. The plants in the garden were “readily discernible
to the naked eye as marijuana,” and the Court viewed the officers’ aerial
position as a “public vantage point,” similar to that obtained by travel
upon “public thoroughfares.”6 Therefore, the Court determined that the
householder “knowingly exposed” his enclosed backyard to the police; it
was irrelevant that the officers, unlike the flying public, were conducting
a targeted search for marijuana plants that they were trained to
recognize.7
It was not surprising that the majority opinion in Ciraolo provoked an
impassioned dissent. The decision was unprecedented in sanctioning
aerial surveillance as a police strategy for evading Fourth Amendment
prohibitions of surveillance on the ground.8 The officers rented a plane
because they did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant to enter
and search the backyard, and because their attempts to peer into the yard
were stymied by a tall fence.9 They could not crawl over the fence
because that intrusion would violate the householder’s protected expectation
1. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
2. These Fourth Amendment terms of art should be treated as having quotation
marks throughout this Article.
3. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213–14.
6. Id. at 213.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 225 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 209 (majority opinion).
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of privacy in his “curtilage,” the Fourth Amendment buffer zone of land
associated with the “sanctity” of a dwelling and the “privacies” of home
life.10 Even in the absence of a high fence around the yard, the officers
could not have crossed a smaller curtilage marker, such as a mow-line
around a manicured lawn, in order to inspect the garden or peer into the
windows of the house.11 With the curtilage boundary as the first constitutional
line of defense for both the yard and the home, the police would never
get to the windows without a warrant or exigent circumstances.12 Yet,
the Ciraolo Court implicitly discarded the “personal and societal values”
embodied in the curtilage barrier on the ground, by making the judgment
that the same values did not justify the protection of the same home and
garden privacy interest from a different point of police access.13
What was surprising about Ciraolo was that Justice Powell authored
the dissent, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
Before Ciraolo, Powell had authored the opinion in Oliver v. United
States, holding that no expectation of privacy could attach to land
outside the curtilage, no matter how many “No Trespassing” signs a
householder had posted on that land.14 Moreover, Powell agreed with
the outcome reached in 95% of 133 search and seizure cases decided
during his tenure on the Court.15 He wrote only two Fourth Amendment
dissents in twenty-five years, and one of them was in Ciraolo.16
Powell’s abandonment of his role as conservative centrist in order to
10. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). See, e.g., United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992,
993–94 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding officers violated curtilage by climbing fence).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1279 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding
officers violated curtilage by entering lawn); State v. Ross, 959 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1998) (approving entry of curtilage when officers imitated normal conduct of
social visitors).
12. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–87 (1980); cf. United States v.
Whaley, 781 F.2d 417, 418–19 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that entry upon curtilage land to
inspect suspicious plants visible from outside curtilage violated Fourth Amendment).
13. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182–83). After Powell
retired from the Court, the Court decided another curtilage flyover case. See Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
14. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (labeling all land outside the curtilage as unprotected
“open fields” subject to police entry and visual surveillance).
15. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 571 (2001). By contrast,
Justices Marshall and Brennan agreed with the Court’s outcome in only 40% of these
decisions. Id.
16. See also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (companion case to Ciraolo). Justice Powell frequently authored concurring
opinions in Fourth Amendment cases, while voting with the majority or plurality.
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dissent was one measure of the controversial nature of the Ciraolo
decision.17
A notable achievement of the Ciraolo dissent was Powell’s clarification
of the relationship between the curtilage doctrines and the expectation of
privacy analysis inaugurated in Katz v. United States.18 At the outset,
Powell’s opinion articulated a set of first principles to explain how the
underlying purposes of Fourth Amendment protections are grounded in
the liberty interest in freedom from surveillance.19 Powell recognized
curtilage and home privacies as a single Fourth Amendment concept,20
functioning within the framework of expectation analysis, and in turn,
informing the application of that analysis. He viewed the entire web of
decisions relating to a particular type of police intrusion as relevant to
expectation analysis concerning that intrusion.21 His Ciraolo dissent
foreshadowed the interpretations of Katz and commitments made to
privacy in Kyllo v. United States,22 and displayed a similar dedication to
the effort to protect householders from police intrusions made possible
by advancing technology.23 In the end, Justice Powell’s opinion served
as an invitation to reimagine the judicial dialogue that may be used to
debate the necessities for protections against police intrusions that occur
either inside or outside our gardens.
Part II.A of this Article describes Justice Powell’s first principles that
framed his judgments in Ciraolo, and explores their significance by
comparing them to the majority’s premises. Part II.B focuses on Powell’s
explication of the Katz framework and its relationship to the curtilagehome privacy doctrines established before Katz. Part III describes the
defining moments for the back story of Ciraolo. Part IV presents
speculations as to how Justice Powell would have resolved privacy
issues in cases after Ciraolo, based on the views in his dissent.

17. When almost 3000 decisions during Powell’s tenure were sorted into twentyone categories, it turned out that Powell agreed with the Court’s outcome in 90% or more
of the cases in thirteen categories, and in 80% or more of the cases in six categories.
JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at xi, 571–72. See also id. at 533 (noting that the Burger Court
of the 1970s and 1980s “might more accurately be called the Powell Court” because
Powell was “probably its single most influential member”).
18. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 219–20, 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing
implications of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
19. Id. at 217–19, 225–26.
20. Id. at 217–21.
21. Id. at 219–20.
22. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that thermal imager violates expectation of
home privacy).
23. Compare id. at 34–35, with Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 218–19 & n.3 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).

554

HANCOCK

11/9/2007 10:52:38 AM

[VOL. 44: 551, 2007]

The Ciraolo Dissent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

II. THE ANATOMY OF JUSTICE POWELL’S CIRAOLO DISSENT
A. First Principles for Articulating Fourth Amendment Liberties
Justice Powell’s polestar for his Fourth Amendment compass was the
Framers’ political “choice” to create a society in which “citizens” enjoy
legal protections of the right to “dwell in reasonable security and
freedom from surveillance.”24 These protections were not the maligned
refuge of lawbreakers, but rather, the historic methods by which law
enforcement practices were intended to be limited or prohibited,25 “in
order to prevent ‘any stealthy encroachments’ of our citizens’ right to be
free of arbitrary official intrusion.”26 Furthermore, the constantly improving
investigative capabilities of police officers established a dominant
Fourth Amendment priority—the need to construct new legal protections
for security and freedom in place of outdated and ineffective ones.27
To guide courts in this task of designing new doctrinal safeguards
against the evolving forms of Fourth Amendment harms, Justice Powell
offered two insights. First, the Katz question—Is there a reasonable
expectation of privacy?—was the place to start the dialogue about these
designs.28 This dialogue should incorporate the study of pre-Katz decisions,
especially the opinions that explained the ways to construct new measures
of Fourth Amendment harms in place of the obsolete and highly
fictionalized “physical trespass” formula, which had obstructed the
Court’s recognition of wiretapping as a search and seizure.29 Second,
the ultimate abandonment of that formula in Katz embodied the Court’s
commitment to discard doctrines that provided “no real protection” for

24. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 217 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
25. See id. at 226 n.11.
26. Id. at 217–18 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
27. Id. at 217 (reasoning that “contemporary norms and conditions” must guide the
task of updating the definition of searches and seizures).
28. Id. at 218.
29. Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139–41 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting)). See also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
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security and liberty,30 and to replace these castoffs with doctrines tailored
to match the relevant new incarnations of surveillance.31
Powell’s second insight derived from his perception that the physical
trespass formula served a protective function in an era when walls were
reliable barriers, and when intrusions could not be performed without the
proximate presence of visible, tangible, recognizable, official intruders.
But that function eroded with the arrival of devices that empowered
officers “to see people’s activities and associations, and to hear their
conversations, without being in physical proximity.”32 Therefore, the
significance of the Katz Court’s abandonment of the physical trespass
formula had little to do with an aversion to property law, and everything
to do with the failure of the formula to address the harms of “silent and
unseen invasions” of privacy rights.33 The officially approved replacement
for the physical trespass formula became the requirement of a reasonable
expectation of privacy, which reshaped the definitions of searches and
seizures with a focus on “the interests of the individual and of a free
society.”34
What was notable about Powell’s first principles? He recognized the
richness of the privacy concept by affirming its dimensions of “security”
and “freedom,” and similarly translated the old-fashioned, literalistic
terms, searches and seizures, into “surveillance.” These rhetorical choices
echoed the language of Fourth Amendment precedents before and after
Katz, and captured Powell’s vision of the privacy interest at stake in
Ciraolo.35 The connotation of security delivered a portrait of the
psychological states of feeling safe from danger and fear, while the
concept of freedom conjured images of behavior, such as ease of
movement, frankness of speech, and the power to act without subjection
to the power of the government.36 By contrast, the term privacy may
30. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining the need to
provide “real protection against surveillance techniques made possible through
technology”).
31. See id. at 218 & n.3 (citing Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(declaring that “the privacy of the citizen is equally invaded” by “new methods” of
surveillance “that penetrate walls and overcome distances” as by “the direct and obvious
methods of oppression which were detested by our forbears”)).
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id. at 226. See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 315–21 (1972) (requiring warrants for domestic wiretapping surveillance program).
34. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 226 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885))
(explaining the essence of Fourth Amendment violations as including “the invasion” of
the rights of “personal security” and “personal liberty”). See also Thomas K. Clancy,
What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 307, 344–48 nn.255–57, 276 (1998) (citing cases).
36. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1575
(4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/security (last visited
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connote the narrower senses of its Shakespearian era origins, including
conditions of seclusion, concealment, and isolation from the sight and
presence of others, from their intrusions or disturbances, or from their
access to knowledge of one’s personal matters.37 The difference between
privacy conceived as liberty or security and privacy conceived as
concealment was reflected in the contrasting characterizations of the
defendant’s experience in Ciraolo. As the Court described it, Ciraolo’s
expectation was the “hope that no one would observe his unlawful
gardening,”38 but for Powell, Ciraolo’s expectation was the desire to enjoy
life outside “in his backyard,” a “family area,” containing “a swimming
pool and a patio for sunbathing and other private activities.”39 Powell
saw Ciraolo as speaking for all people with backyards, who wish to live
under the “open air and sunlight,”40 not hidden away in their houses or
under large tents, but secure in the peace and intimate atmosphere of an
afternoon family picnic or a solitary swim in the nude.
Powell’s use of the term surveillance captured the special connotation
of police gathering of data, deriving from its origins as “seemingly a
word of the Terror in France.”41 While the Ciraolo majority ignored
Powell’s use of the terms security and freedom, his use of the terms
surveillance or aerial surveillance was contested in a tug of words that
demonstrated the emotional power of Powell’s vocabulary.42 Chief
Justice Burger substituted the terms observation or aerial observation to
Sep. 5, 2007) (security); DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/freedom (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (freedom).
37. See 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 515 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner
eds., 2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/“privacy” (last visited
Sep. 5, 2007) (privacy); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1396 (4th ed. 2000), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
privacy (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (same).
38. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212.
39. Id. at 222 & n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 225 n.10. Compare id. (“[A]fter today, families can expect to be free of
official surveillance only when they retreat behind the walls of their homes.”), with
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
402 (1977) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should not require people to seek
protection from surveillance “by retiring to the cellar” or permit people “to be driven
back into the recess of their lives by the risk of surveillance”).
41. See ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, available at http://www.etymonline.
com/index.php?term=surveillance (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (surveillance); id. (noting
French origin as surveiller); DICTIONARY.COM UNABRIDGED, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/surveillance (last visited Sep. 5, 2007) (surveillance).
42. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 216–26 & nn.3, 10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (using the
terms surveillance or aerial surveillance at least twenty times).
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serve as neutral descriptions of the flyover, invoking an aura of passive
conduct unrelated to police status, implicitly equating the actions and
powers of police officers with those of anyone else.43 Burger also
implicitly disputed Powell’s use of the term surveillance to include all
acts of police collections of data, by rejecting the notion that visual
detection practices, such as aerial monitoring of backyards, could be
viewed as posing similar dangers to privacy interests as aural detection
practices, such as the electronic monitoring of telephone calls prohibited
by Katz. In Burger’s view, the Katz Court’s concern with devising
protections from the nonphysical police intrusions could not have been
“aimed at” the police practice of “simple visual observations from a
public place,” which is how he characterized the flyover inspection in
Ciraolo.44
Other conflicts between Powell’s first principles and the Ciraolo
majority’s premises could be characterized as differences of perspective
that produced completely different frames for the Ciraolo problem.
Burger assumed that Powell’s fears about the dangers of stealthy
intrusions of advancing technology could be set aside, because the Katz
Court would not have considered aircraft to be “electronic” devices, or
viewed “flight in the public airways” as anything but “routine.”45 Similarly,
Burger brushed off Powell’s concern about the need for protections
against “broad and unsuspected governmental incursions” into “cherished
privacy” of large numbers of “law-abiding citizens.”46 During the flyover,
the officers photographed not only Ciraolo’s yard, including his pool and
patio as well as his garden, but also his home, and the homes and yards
of his neighbors. Powell characterized this conduct as “indiscriminate”
surveillance,47 as a reminder that officers performing an airborne mission to
photograph a particular backyard would not be likely to avert their eyes
from their view of all the curtilages and homes on their aerial route. But
the significance of the photographic intrusions in Ciraolo was dismissed
by Burger as irrelevant, because the photograph attached to the warrant

43. Id. at 209–16 & nn. 1, 3 (majority opinion) (using the terms observe,
observing, observation(s), or aerial observation(s) at least thirty times, while using the
word surveillance only twice, once in reference to “electronic surveillance,” and once in
reference to “a method of surveillance”).
44. Id. at 214 (concern with protection of telephone booth conversations about
crime “does not translate readily” into concern with protection of backyard drug
cultivation).
45. Id. at 215.
46. Id. at 218 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972)).
47. Id. at 225.
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affidavit did not reveal the color of the suspect plants.48 To the Court
majority, police flyovers did not present a serious threat “to privacy
interests in the home,” and so could be allowed to “escape entirely” from
“Fourth Amendment oversight” by the courts.49 Powell considered both
the Court’s result and reasoning to be “flawed.”50 They “depart[ed]
significantly”51 from Katz expectation analysis, and they were “curiously
at odds” with curtilage-home privacy doctrines.52 For Powell, these were
strong words.53
B. The Fifth Wall and the Second Ceiling: Powell’s Understanding of
Katz’s Protection of Curtilage-Home Privacy
Compared to Powell’s exegesis of Katz and its relationship to pre-Katz
precedents, Burger took a much simpler approach in Ciraolo. He
resolved the privacy issue by relying mainly on a few post-Katz privacy
decisions,54 reducing the reasoning of each decision to a maxim or two,
and applying the maxims by analogy to the police flyover. In Powell’s
eyes, however, Burger only purported to reaffirm the analytical
framework of Katz with regard to the question whether “society was
prepared to recognize” the protection of Ciraolo’s privacy interest “as
reasonable.”55 One flaw in the Ciraolo opinion was the failure to consider
the appropriate factors for answering that question, as endorsed in a variety
of precedents. A more complex flaw was the Court’s unwillingness to
recognize the validity of the operation of pre-Katz curtilage doctrines,
and its tolerance for destabilizing the requirements of those doctrines
through the use of the knowing exposure concept, interpreted expansively in
post-Katz precedents but even more expansively in Ciraolo.

48. Id. at 212 n.1 (majority opinion) (finding police testimony sufficient to support
warrant, making it unnecessary to address relevance of photograph of curtilage to privacy
issue).
49. Id. at 225 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Karo, 469 U.S. 705,
716 (1984)).
50. Id. at 223.
51. Id. at 216.
52. Id. at 219.
53. Id. See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 559.
54. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 210–13 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170
(1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98 (1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)).
55. Id. at 219 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Powell’s list of factors for assessing privacy expectations began with
the determination of the “personal and societal values” at stake in the
protection of curtilage from aerial surveillance.56 The Ciraolo majority
made passing reference to this point,57 but then ignored the remaining
factors on Powell’s list, including the “understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society,”58 and the “societal understanding that certain
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection,”59 such as the home, which
stands “at the very core of the Fourth Amendment,”60 and in which a
subjective expectation of privacy “virtually always will be legitimate.”61
Relying on Oliver’s recognition of the curtilage as “part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,”62 Powell treated the curtilage as
deserving the same “scrupulous” protection because of its inseparability
from the home; without using the term curtilage-home, he consistently
treated the two legal constructs as one.63 Other factors on the list included
the intention of the Framers, the uses to which a person has put a
location,64 and the common law generally,65 including concepts of “real
or personal property law.”66 The expectation for curtilage privacy qualified
as “reasonable” in light of these sources. For example, the curtilage
concept defined the scope of common law burglary,67 and it was the area
understood by the Framers to be associated with the intimate or domestic
activity of the home.68
If Powell had authored a majority opinion protecting the privacy
interest in Ciraolo, he could have rested his decision upon this list of
factors and his first principles for interpreting Katz. Neither analytical
foundation pointed to a distinction between a home dweller’s groundlevel expectations and aerial expectations of privacy that would justify a
Fourth Amendment loophole for flyover inspections. Powell viewed the
56. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182–83).
57. Id. at 212 (majority opinion) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181–83).
58. Id. at 220 n.5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
143 n.12 (1978)).
59. Id. (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178).
60. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 364 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
61. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 425 U.S. 573, 589 (1980)); see also id. at 219
n.4 (writing that “legitimate” and “reasonable” are interchangeable terms).
62. Id. at 220 (quoting Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180).
63. It is easy to recognize the curtilage as a construct, but so is a home. See Robert
J. Leibovich, Note, Privacy Goes Camping: Staking a Claim on the Fourth Amendment,
26 U. MEM. L. REV. 293, 303–14 (1995) (discussing cases addressing the question
whether the Fourth Amendment protections of a home attach to a camping tent).
64. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178).
65. Id. at 217.
66. Id. at 220 n.5 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
67. Eric Dean Bender, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial
Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 731–34 (1985).
68. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.
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pre-Katz curtilage doctrines as establishing both an invisible fifth wall
that prohibited the entry and presence of police in a backyard, and an
invisible second ceiling that provided the equivalent protection from
airborne police inspectors. In Powell’s judgment, the curtilage concept
created “real protection” against evolving police surveillance methods
such as the flyover. Implicitly, he viewed curtilage doctrines as bearing
no resemblance to the unprotective physical trespass doctrine abandoned
by Katz in the electronic surveillance context.
Powell did not explain the significance of his disagreement with the
Court’s failure to use his list of factors to guide its decision. He let the
cited sources for each factor speak for themselves, and they revealed his
position that all Fourth Amendment privacy issues shared common
ground. Precedents regarding warrant exceptions appeared as the source
of authority for some of Powell’s factors. He recognized what the majority
declined to consider, which was that such precedents usually included
evaluations of the strength or weakness of the privacy expectation that
was assumed to exist in each case.69 The particular significance of Powell’s
commitment to casting a wide net for ideas about privacy was that the
warrant-exception decisions repeatedly emphasized the values of home
privacy, thereby supporting his reasoning concerning the powerful need
for protecting curtilage-home privacy in the context of aerial surveillance.70
The more general significance of Powell’s position was that it reflected
one of his first principles, that evolving police practices required the
tailoring of new protections to match them. Powell recognized that the
validation of a reasonable privacy expectation constituted a presumptive
decision that the only adequate protection for that expectation consisted
of the warrant and probable cause requirements. Therefore, the warrant
precedents were necessarily relevant in recognizing how a privacy
interest should be defined. Powell did not care to measure privacy in the
abstract for its own sake. Rather, he wished to expose all the concerns
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence could contribute to a judgment
about whether to require police officers to comply with warrant protections.
The implied position of the Ciraolo majority, considering the message
presented by Burger’s citations, was that the only significant authorities
for determining the validity of a privacy expectation, as a threshold issue,
69. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6–13 (1977), abrogated by
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
70. See, e.g., Steageld v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–12 (1981); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980).
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were other precedents resolving the same issue. This position restricted
privacy analysis in two different ways. First, Burger’s perspective
dramatically narrowed the range of ideas that could inform a debate
about the significance of allowing a particular unregulated intrusion to
affect the lives of citizens in a free society. Second, his limited analysis
magnified exponentially the precedential power of analogy-making as a
determinant of results in privacy cases. With only privacy precedents on
the table, in each new privacy case the courts would be forced to stretch
potentially inapposite holdings to reach the new scenario. In this way,
Burger’s perspective endowed each anti-privacy precedent with greater
influence than it would be accorded in Powell’s analytical world. The
Ciraolo majority’s reasoning displayed each of these features of the
closed world of privacy precedents. For example, Burger reasoned that
the police conduct of visual surveillance on public streets, by means of
tailing a suspect on foot or by car, so as to gain only the knowledge of
her route, resembled a flyover in which police took photographs of a
backyard that they were prohibited from inspecting at the ground level.
By contrast, Powell recognized the value of expanding the dialogue of
privacy debate beyond the similarity of Katz’s phone booth to Ciraolo’s
garden.71
Powell explained his reasons for objecting to the more complex flaw
in the Ciraolo opinion in some detail, and he candidly identified
Burger’s knowing exposure theory as a fiction that allowed judges to
impose the risks of police surveillance on people whose activities were
subject to public scrutiny.72 After Ciraolo, those risks would fall on a
broad class of mostly law-abiding people who wished to enjoy life
outdoors in their yards.73 Powell compared the claimed similarities
between the risks actually taken by such home dwellers and the risks of
police surveillance imposed in Ciraolo, and concluded that the Court’s
claim of equivalence was so implausible as to deserve rejection.74 If
Ciraolo’s home were not located in a flight path for landing or takeoff,
Powell regarded it as extremely unlikely that a traveler’s plane could be
flying at a sufficiently low altitude to see the garden.75 He emphasized
that a traveler would not be trained to recognize marijuana, would not
know Ciraolo’s identity, would have no reason to glance out the window
except serendipitously, and would have only the briefest of opportunities
71. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214–15.
72. Id. at 224–25 & n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 229 n.10.
74. Id. at 224–25. Compare Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New
Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627–39 (1989) (explaining
proposal for assessing risk of exposure for expectation analysis).
75. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 n.8 (Powell, J., dissenting).

562

HANCOCK

[VOL. 44: 551, 2007]

11/9/2007 10:52:38 AM

The Ciraolo Dissent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

to view the scene. Police officers in a flyover operation would exhibit
none of these characteristics.76 Thus, the Court’s decision forced home
dwellers without total tent coverage to accept an invasive risk of police
surveillance as the consequence of choosing to live with an extremely
remote risk of fleeting public scrutiny.
The Ciraolo majority, however, did not claim that the risk of public
scrutiny was meaningful, only that it existed. Nor did the majority claim
that the purposeful police officers and the clueless traveler constituted a
similar risk. Chief Justice Burger simply treated the dissimilarities as
irrelevant. By contrast to the candor and realistic assumptions underlying
Powell’s arguments, Burger’s arguments possessed the character of
hardened fictions that cannot be answered. The knowing exposure maxim
had become the substitute for physical trespass, a barrier to the recognition
of real privacy harms. The expectation inquiry no longer exhibited judicial
sensitivity to personal and societal values, exemplified in Katz’s concern
with the “vital role” of the telephone in “private communications,”77 and
pre-Katz concerns for the protection of the confidentiality of beliefs and
thoughts.78
Powell’s critique of the knowing exposure theory also included his
objection to the incompatibility of that theory with curtilage doctrines.
The fence around Ciraolo’s backyard obscured more than the view of the
police officers; it also obscured the point that for ground-level protection
of the curtilage, no fence was necessary. Its existence was merely a
factor enhancing the eligibility of the yard for curtilage status. Even
without the fence, a police officer who wished to inspect a backyard
would be tethered invisibly to the sidewalk. She would be free to
exercise the power of plain view, but she could go no further, either to
cross the curtilage boundary on foot, or to climb a tree or a ladder to get
a better view, as Powell pointed out.79 Yet nothing would prevent a
passerby from entering a curtilage, other than the ire of the home dweller
or threats of legal action when discovered. Thus, no equivalence existed
between the ready access of the walking or tree-climbing public and the
forbidden access of the officer. The curtilage-home privacy rules left no
room for the application of a knowing exposure theory, but embodied
76. Id. at 223–24.
77. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
78. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
79. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 222 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
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the opposite perspective that police officers and curious passersby had
nothing in common. The unique police threat of surveillance on the
ground would never be conflated with the risk of intrusions by random
unwelcome visitors without a badge. Paradoxically, the Ciraolo majority
decided that the curtilage taboo that kept police officers from climbing
trees should not keep them from hovering at a somewhat higher distance
where the access of curious passersby was “virtually nonexistent.”80
The Ciraolo majority also managed to perpetuate a sense of uncertainty
about the application of the Katz framework in the curtilage-home context.
Powell treated the undisputed finding that Ciraolo’s yard qualified as
curtilage as sufficient proof of his subjective manifestation of a privacy
interest required by Katz.81 Similarly, after noting that it was unnecessary
for the Court to address the manifestation issue, Burger added that
Ciraolo had “met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and
desire to maintain his privacy.”82 But then, Burger found it “not entirely
clear” whether Ciraolo had manifested his expectation “from all observations
of his backyard,” pointing out that a citizen or police officer “perched on
the top of a truck or a two-level bus” might observe the plants in the
garden.83 Yet if Ciraolo did not adequately manifest his expectation from
aerial observation, there was no need to address the question whether his
expectation was reasonable. Burger also noted that it would be unreasonable
for Ciraolo to assume “his unlawful conduct w[ould] not be observed”
by “a power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard.”84
By these observations in dicta, Burger not only minimized the significance
of the State’s concession that the backyard qualified as curtilage,85 but
also implied that officers might gain lawful visual access to curtilage
whenever their feet left the ground, in spite of curtilage rules to the
contrary.
The Ciraolo majority thus provided ambiguous signals to lower courts,
although it was clear that home dwellers now possessed no reasonable
expectation of privacy from naked-eye surveillance of curtilage land
during flyovers at 1000 feet—a holding that was extended later to
helicopters at 400 feet.86 Perhaps the Court’s reasoning also implied that
80. Id. at 223.
81. Id. at 213 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 211.
83. Id. at 211–12.
84. Id. at 214–15.
85. Id. at 213. Powell enumerated the lower courts’ factors for curtilage boundaries
that produced this concession: “because of the close proximity of the yard to the house,
the nature of some of the activities” conducted there, and because Ciraolo “had taken
steps to shield those activities from the view of the passersby.” Id. at 222 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
86. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (White, J., plurality opinion).
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the knowing exposure theory could be applied to other curtilage scenarios
where police imitated the conduct of curious passersby. Maybe the
Court meant to encourage lower courts to go further, and allow police
officers to climb utility poles or perch on passing trucks, in order to
cheat the ground-level boundary rules against manipulating plain view
opportunities to observe the curtilage. However, the Court made no allusion
to the significantly increased enforcement efforts to root out homegrown
marijuana production, starting in the late 1970s at the time when
successful eradication in Mexico suddenly opened a market for domestic
cultivation of the drug.87 At least for the Ciraolo majority, expectation
analysis did not include express consideration of law enforcement needs
to escape the burdens of Fourth Amendment scrutiny because of the
difficulties attendant in complying with the warrant requirement. The
burden was on Ciraolo to persuade the Court to recognize his Fourth
Amendment privacy as a privilege. It was not a right.
III. THE BACK STORY FOR CIRAOLO: REFRAMING CURTILAGE AS A
PROTECTION OF EXPECTATIONS
The first defining moment that marked the beginning of the back story
for Ciraolo was the silence of the Katz opinion in explaining how preKatz doctrines, such as those protecting curtilage-home privacy, should
be interpreted after the physical trespass concept was abandoned as a
general requirement for searches and seizures. Until Katz, the Supreme
Court treated curtilage-home privacy issues as an uncontroversial part of
the river of lower court Fourth Amendment interpretations that could be
left to roll along undisturbed. But the rhetoric of the Katz opinion displayed
a confusing blend of caution and overstatement. The overstatements, taken
literally, could have been taken to imply that the protection of dwelling
and curtilage should be abandoned, because the Fourth Amendment should
protect “people, not places,” and because a “constitutionally protected
area” was not a useful concept.88 It seemed more sensible to infer that
Justice Stewart’s language expressed only excessive enthusiasm for the
death knell of the physical trespass requirement, and perhaps an overly
87. Brendan Peters, Note, Fourth Amendment Yard Work: Curtilage’s Mow-Line
Rule, 56 STAN. L. REV. 943, 964 & nn.128–33 (2004). By 1986, Americans produced
“up to half of the marijuana consumed domestically.” See id. at 964 n.129. Several
amicus briefs argued that the value of curtilage flyovers in anti-marijuana enforcement
programs justified the rejection of the privacy claim in Ciraolo.
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9, 353 (1967).
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defensive attitude toward the reversal of precedent. But after the Court
adopted the vocabulary of “expectations” to describe the Katz privacy
requirements,89 it seemed especially important for guidance to be
provided as to how that vocabulary should be used to express the harms
caused by invasions of curtilage-home privacy, now stripped of the
unnecessary appendage of physical trespass. This translation of expectations
was difficult for some observers to envision, because the idea of trespass
was stuck like glue to their visions of a police officer walking across a
curtilage boundary, and because the idea of property was similarly stuck
to the curtilage land.90
One source of inspiration could have been the law of burglary that
gave rise to the curtilage concept before it became attached to the Fourth
Amendment. By analogy, the police officer in a post-Katz world could
have been reimagined as a Fourth Amendment intruder who violated the
security and freedom of a home dweller. The burglary-based origins of
curtilage could have been used to rub off the glue of trespass from the
feet of officers treading upon the lawn next to a dwelling. At common
law, the object of punishing burglary was “not to prevent trespasses,”91
but to punish entries that might frighten persons who might be present,
because any intruder’s entry could signal danger.92 Admittedly, the crime
included extraneous elements, requiring the night-time breaking and entry
of dwellings or curtilage structures.93 But in spite of these technicalities,
the burglary crime served to illustrate how the concept of a protected
area could be intertwined with the protection of expectations of privacy.
Moreover, even before Katz, the Fourth Amendment version of the
curtilage concept was more expansive than the burglary concept, and
encompassed the police crossing of the curtilage boundary to inspect
visually whatever might be on the curtilage land. This fifth wall of a
dwelling established its value as a necessary barrier to police intrusion
based on the “domestic activities” of the home dwellers that might occur
within its confines. Those activities continued in a different form, after

89. See David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72
MISS. L.J. 143, 156–57 (2002) (noting that the Court “lost little time” in retroactively
validating Justice Harlan’s “gloss” from his Katz concurrence in Terry v. Ohio, 391 U.S.
1 (1968)).
90. Compare Bender, supra note 67, at 736–38 (noting descriptions of curtilage as
property concept), with United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 n.3 (1987) (recognizing
burglary roots of curtilage concept).
91. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 74 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963) (1881).
92. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *223 (explaining that burglary is a
heinous crime because “of the abundant terror that it naturally carries with it” as a
“forcible invasion and disturbance of [the] right of habitation”).
93. See Bender, supra note 67, at 731–33.
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the passing of the era when “the kitchen, the laundry, the springhouse,
the woodshed, and most particularly the ‘outhouse’” were not to be found
“within the four walls” of houses.94 After Katz, it should have been
easier to see that the feet of police officers on the lawn had always been
covered with the intangible mud of expectations, and easier to explain
how the curtilage idea was designed to protect “people” and their privacy
rather than land per se.
The second defining moment for the back story of Ciraolo occurred
when lower courts decided to take different directions in their struggle to
envision curtilage-home privacy violations as translatable into terms that
expressed Katzian values. These directions demonstrated confusion. For
example, one court stopped referring to curtilage when discussing privacy
expectations in backyards, while others noted that curtilage boundaries
would be at least relevant in determining the reasonableness of an
expectation.95 Another direction illustrated the willingness of some courts
to use expectation analysis to expand Fourth Amendment protection to
“closed woods” as a special category of the open fields land that lay
beyond the curtilage. These courts relied on the theory that a home dweller
might seek to preserve the wooded area as private, just as Katz closed
the door of his phone booth.96
The Oliver opinion by Powell sought to wipe out one stream of confusion
by implying in dicta that positive conclusions about reasonable privacy
expectations were, indeed, expressed in the definitions of curtilage
boundaries established in pre-Katz lower court decisions. But Powell
supplied no particulars of those definitions until his Ciraolo dissent
named the factors used in the decisions cited in Oliver; perhaps he
assumed that the longstanding factors were so familiar to lower courts as
to require no repetition. In Ciraolo, Powell recognized that the Court
was rejecting aerial curtilage protection before it had even endorsed a
definition of ground curtilage, and so he listed the lower court factors to
94. S. Brian Lawrence III, Comment, Curtilage or Open Fields?: Oliver v. United
States Gives Renewed Significance to the Concept of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment
Analysis, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 813 n.101 (1985) (quoting Judge Charles E. Moylan,
Jr., The Fourth Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The
Neglected Threshold of “So What?,” 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 87). An important modern
issue in curtilage doctrine is how to apply similar protections to urban dwellings. See
Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to
Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 297 (2005).
95. See Bender, supra note 67, at 737–38 nn.68–77 (citing cases).
96. See Lawrence, supra note 94, at 804–05 & nn.73, 74.
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fill that vacuum.97 His Oliver opinion also shut off the stream of protection
for closed woods in the open fields, pronouncing all open fields
unprotected, whether open in a literal sense or not.98 But Oliver arrived
too late and said too little to provide guidance concerning the applicability
of non-curtilage expectation precedents to the problem of aerial curtilage
protection. During the era between Katz and Oliver, some of Justice
Stewart’s statements in Katz had been transformed into new rhetoric for
the restriction of privacy rights.99 The precedential landscape and rhetoric
of the Ciraolo opinions were significantly affected by the Court’s delay
in waiting until Oliver to discuss the character of home-curtilage privacy
protection in the post-Katz world.
By the time Ciraolo was argued, the third defining moment had ended,
namely the era when lower courts grappled with the aerial surveillance
problem. Their diversity of views suggested that if Justice Powell intended
to imply in Oliver that the curtilage doctrines should be left intact, rather
than revised with the dissolving fluid of non-curtilage precedents, that
message had not been heard. Some lower courts adopted the opposing
positions later espoused by Powell and Burger, while others worked at
compromise, by attempting to distinguish between lawful aerial police
observations that resembled those of a hypothetically “reasonably curious
passerby” in the sky, and unlawful observations resembling those of an
“unreasonably curious passerby” in that location.100 By this time, the
byword for the manifestation concept had become a requirement to take
“normal precautions” to maintain privacy.101 Some judges assumed that
the manifestation element in an aerial case should require more than a
simple finding of curtilage status. If these judges had looked to Oliver
for guidance on this point, they would have noticed that it was only
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion that emphasized how some spaces
like homes “are so presumptively private” that manifestation is

97. Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(citing cases relying on such factors as the existence of an enclosure around the potential
curtilage area, the proximity of the area to a dwelling, the “nature of the uses to which
the area is put,” and the “steps taken . . . to protect the area from observation by people
passing by”), with Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (same). See also
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (endorsing same factors used in
Ciraolo dissent for defining curtilage boundaries).
98. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178–84.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–85 (1983); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104–05
(1980); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–45 (1979); see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at
211, 213 (citing Knotts, Rawlings, and Smith).
100. See Bender, supra note 67, at 746–48.
101. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105.
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unnecessary.102 Yet even these judges took different directions, with
some treating the failure to cover a backyard with a tent as a failure to
take normal precautions, while others looked for a manifestation of
ground privacy, such as a fence, before counting that as a manifestation
transferable to the sky.103 As it turned out, the Court did not adopt either
type of manifestation requirement, but decided instead that a reasonable
expectation of privacy from the type of surveillance in Ciraolo could not
exist in an uncovered curtilage.
Almost twenty years after Katz, the Ciraolo opinions finally exposed
the Court’s own debate concerning the integration of curtilage-home
privacy doctrines into the Katz expectation framework. In the long run,
the impact of that debate, if it can be judged from the content of an FBI
lecture to agents on rules for curtilage surveillance,104 was to create a
“highway in the sky” rule that has not undone the fifth wall of the
curtilage boundary on the ground.105 But the taboo against climbing a
few feet of fence in Kansas does not stop an officer from scaling a forty
foot tree in Maryland.106
IV. CONCLUSION: POWELL’S GARDEN IN LATER YEARS
Justice Powell retired one year after his Ciraolo dissent, and for the
next decade, he often sat by designation on federal courts of appeals. It
is tempting to speculate about how he would have voted in privacy cases
if he had stayed on the Court.107 Perhaps he would have persuaded

102. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
at 220 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[A] home is a place in which a subjective expectation of
privacy virtually always will be legitimate . . . .”).
103. See Bender, supra note 67, at 746 n.121 (citing cases).
104. Peters, supra note 87, at 965 n.135 (citing John Gales Sauls, Curtilage: The
Fourth Amendment in the Garden, http://www.totse.com/en/law/justice_for_all/curtilag.
html (last visited Sept. 5, 2007) (providing hypotheticals and discussion of curtilage
rules; authored by a Special Agent and Legal Instructor at the FBI Academy)).
105. See Bender, supra note 67, at 747 (citing Williams v. State, 277 S.E.2d 923,
925 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (making highway in the sky analogy)).
106. Compare State v. Waldschmidt, 740 P.2d 617, 623 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987)
(reasoning that “the curtilage doctrine would be meaningless” if a public vantage point
under Ciraolo could be obtained by climbing a nearby fence), with Kitzmiller v. State,
548 A.2d 140, 143 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (distinguishing impermissible ladder
climbing from permissible tree climbing that produces airplane-type view like Ciraolo
flyover).
107. See JEFFRIES, supra note 15, at 556–57 (comparing Kennedy’s votes to those
Powell might have cast). Even if Powell had remained on the Court from 1987 until his
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Justice O’Connor to make his Ciraolo dissent into a majority rule, if he
could have encouraged her skepticism about the frequency of public air
travel at 400 feet.108 Perhaps he would have provided the fifth vote for
the protection of a privacy expectation in garbage located on the
sidewalk outside the curtilage,109 because he would have recognized how
the knowing exposure theory, once endorsed, might travel irresistibly
into the curtilage.110 It is difficult to know what he would have thought
about knock and talks, those pretextual visits by police officers who use
a driveway or curtilage path to gain access to a front door in the manner
of a social visitor. He might have approved of police imitations of the
brief contacts of typical door-to-door solicitors; but he would have
recognized that his own risk analysis in Ciraolo suggested that police
officers bring entirely different risks to the front door than a neighbor
who comes to borrow a cup of sugar.111 He joined the Court’s opinion
holding that a dog sniff of luggage in a public place is not a search,112
but he might have had qualms about the use of narcotics-detection dogs
to sniff at cars during traffic stops.113 It is hard to imagine that he would
have approved of the tactic of bringing these dogs inside the curtilage or
up to a front door during a knock and talk.114 Moreover, if Powell’s
willingness to protect containers such as luggage, whether in public or
when placed in cars,115 is any guide, he would have agreed with the
Court’s invalidation of luggage squeezes.116
death in 1998, he would not have voted in the cases discussed in the text at notes 113,
116 & 117 infra.
108. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
109. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–42 (1988).
110. See generally Mark C. Anderson, Note, United States v. Redmon: The Demise
of Curtilage in Fourth Amendment Determinations? A Study of Garbage Searches on
Common Property, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 61, 71–98 (1999) (analyzing expansion of
Greenwood).
111. See Vanessa Rownaghi, Comment, Driving Into Unreasonableness: The
Driveway, the Curtilage, and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1175–88 (2003) (comparing lower court interpretations of
differences between curtilage analysis and Katz expectation analysis of police use of
driveways and paths to enter curtilage).
112. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706–07 (1983).
113. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–11 (2005).
114. Compare State v. Davis, 711 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
dog sniff of apartment door in a common hallway is not a Fourth Amendment search but
is a search under the state constitution), with State v. Rabb, 920 So.2d 1175, 1184 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding dog sniff of the front door of a house is a Fourth
Amendment search). See also Evan B. Citron, Note, Say Hello and Wave Goodbye: The
Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
2761, 2786–808 (2006) (comparing “voluntary exposure” and “sanctity of the home”
theories endorsed in conflicting lower court precedents).
115. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758–65 (1979) (Justice Powell writing
for majority), abrogated by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v.
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It seems very likely that Justice Powell would have approved of the
Kyllo decision, which recognized that police conducted a “search” when
they directed a heat scanner at the walls of a home. The Kyllo Court
shared Powell’s respect for the value of maintaining the “preservation of
that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”117 The Kyllo opinion echoed Powell’s commitment
to establish doctrinal protections against future stealthy encroachments
upon the core Fourth Amendment rights of home privacy.118 Powell’s
Ciraolo dissent advocated a form of curtilage protection that eerily
resembled Kyllo’s protection of the home from surveillance methods
used to obtain information “that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.’”119 So
would Powell have objected to the thermal imaging device, which was
aimed from outside the curtilage in Kyllo, but then have allowed police
the unregulated power to stand outside the curtilage and peer into the
nearby windows of a dwelling, if the “public vantage point” of the police
position seemed fictional?120
Powell was a Justice who virtually never dissented in Fourth Amendment
cases, but that may have been because he preferred not to dissent at all.
His willingness to keep company in Ciraolo with the ideas of Justices
Brandeis and Murphy, and his commitment to a dialogue that expressed
the lived experience of the intangible harms of police surveillance,
made his Ciraolo dissent one for the ages.

Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 6–13 (1977) (joining Court majority), abrogated by California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
116. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336–39 (2000).
117. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
118. See id. at 34–36 (observing that Fourth Amendment definition of searches and
seizures “must take account . . . of sophisticated systems” of thermal imaging technology
“in development”); see also id. at 31 (citing recognition of home privacy as core right in
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
119. Id. at 34.
120. Even the act of peering into windows from outside a curtilage may constitute a
search if the officer no longer occupies a public vantage point. See State v. Carter, 569
N.W.2d 169, 177–78 & n.12 (Minn. 1997), rev’d, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (finding it
unnecessary to determine whether this kind of window peering would be a search
because the defendants were temporary occupants who had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the premises).
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